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New work health and safety (WHS) legislation in many Australian States and Territories 
places specific due diligence obligations on the officers of an organisation. This paper 
questions whether imposing an enforceable WHS duty of care on accounting and 
finance officers is justified and appropriate. 
 
Design / methodology / approach 
The paper critically examines the capacity of accountants and accounting to influence 
work-related injury and illness outcomes across an organisation. Detailed third-party 
investigations into fatal WHS failures are reviewed, focusing on the web of contributing 
factors identified in each case study. Factors that may be traced, directly or indirectly, to 
accounting practices are identified and explored.   
 
Findings 
The findings suggest accounting practices, such as the resourcing and performance 
management decisions of accountants, financial controllers, chief financial officers, chief 
executive officers and directors, can contribute significantly to an increase in WHS 
failure risk. Consequently, the imposition of WHS duty of care and due diligence 
obligations on accounting officers appears justified.  
 
Research limitations / implications 
The findings suggest a fundamental change in thinking about the role of accounting in 
organisational governance may be required. A novel, but critical, threshold concept is 
suggested to form a conceptual link between accounting practice and WHS risk. Further 
research is needed to examine the extent to which this threshold concept is addressed 
in undergraduate and professional accounting education. 
 
Practical implications 
Recommendations for accounting practice are offered, suggesting ways in which 
traditional accounting activities can be modified to better align organisational and WHS 
governance. 
 
Originality / value  
This paper builds a bridge between the accounting, management and WHS literature. 
This interdisciplinary perspective enables the development of a conceptual framework 






Senior accounting and finance professionals play a critical role in controlling an organisation’s 
performance. Where their role meets the definition1 of an ‘officer’ under the Corporations Act 
(2001), they have specific accountabilities relating to work health and safety (WHS) 
performance. Although prosecutions of these accounting and finance professionals (hereafter 
accounting officers) over work-related fatalities are relatively infrequent, they remain a source of 
frustration for those who perceive a distinct lack of influence over workers’ safety at the ‘coal 
face’ (see for example Kumar V Ritchie). This paper seeks to explore the justification for holding 
accounting officers accountable under law for WHS risk management. 
In Australia, the introduction of a positive duty of care requirement for officers in the recent Work 
Health and Safety Act2” (hereafter, the WHS Act) has been cited as a “significant improvement 
on the liability position for individual directors” in some states (Gray and Kellock 2010, p1) and 
“one of the most important reforms” in the new legislation (Sherrif and Tooma 2010, p32). 
Rather than having poorly defined ‘persons in control’ automatically deemed liable for a firms 
failure to ensure WHS, the new provisions impose a specific duty of care on officers and clearly 
articulated minimum due diligence requirements for compliance. These requirements apply to all 
officers, including those in the accounting discipline.  
However, the questions remain: is it appropriate for accounting officers to be subject to this duty 
of care and associated legal liability? Are they genuinely in a position of influence with respect 
to the health and safety of workers? Anecdotal claims of ‘cost cutting’ are occasionally cited as 
contributing factors in WHS disasters (see for example reflections on the Piper Alpha disaster 
(Berger 2009) and Bhopal chemical disaster (Dutta 2002)) and in the workplace fatalities of 







individuals (see for example, Cooper et al. 2011; Ede 2008). Despite this, the accounting 
literature provides little evidence of research that has empirically or theoretically explained the 
hypothesised relationship between the financial resourcing and other routine activities of senior 
accounting professionals and WHS failure.  
This paper seeks to explore such justification by critically examining the capacity of accounting 
professionals to influence WHS outcomes (performance). The paper is structured as follows. 
Section two outlines the case by which accounting executives may be identified as ‘officers’ and 
presents an overview of the WHS Act’s officers duty of care and due diligence provisions. 
Section three draws on WHS literature to outline the two dominant bodies of work on injury and 
illness prevention: one focused on technical approaches to identifying and controlling WHS 
hazards and the other focused on cultural/behavioural approaches. Section four then connects 
WHS and accounting by examining two WHS disaster case studies undertaken by Hopkins 
(2000, 2005, 2008) and teasing out lessons for those charged with accounting oversight. 
Section five reflects on the findings to explore how accounting can support or inhibit WHS. In 
doing so, threshold concepts of WHS are proposed and a conceptual framework for WHS 
governance is proposed. Finally, section six summarises the findings and presents the paper’s 
conclusions. 
2. Officer’s duty of care 
As noted above, many senior accounting and finance professionals meet the Australian 
Corporations Act 2001 definition3 of an ‘officer’ by virtue of their individual role and 
accountabilities and most are therefore subject to the specific duty of care (to exercise due 
diligence) provisions in the WHS Act. Importantly, Australia is a federation of six States and two 
Territories, each with their own work health and safety legislation. Recent efforts to harmonise 
work health and safety law across Australia saw the collaborative development of a model WHS 
Act that could be enacted within each jurisdiction. Slightly different scenarios exist for officers at 
this stage of WHS legislative harmonisation process. Those in New South Wales, Queensland, 
                                                 
3 See Appendix 1 for the Corporations Act definition of an officer. 
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the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory organisations have been subject to 
the new duty of care requirement since their WHS Acts commenced on 1st January 2012. Those 
in Tasmania and South Australia4 will see their new Acts come into force on 1st January 2013. In 
Victoria and Western Australia, existing legislation imposes WHS accountability on ‘persons in 
control’ of a workplace, that is, persons who have, “to any extent”, the management or control of 
a workplace (see Occupational Health and Safety Act (Vic) 2004, s26(1), and Occupational 
Safety and Health Act (WA) 1984, s22(1)). Together, this demonstrates the applicability of WHS 
due diligence considerations to accounting officers in all Australian organisations. 
The new WHS Act (to which most officers will be subject by Jan 2013) imposes specific 
obligations on a ‘person conducting a business or undertaking’ (a PCBU) and on the ‘officers’ of 
the PCBU. These duties cannot be delegated and financial and custodial penalties for failure to 
comply are significant and not covered by directors and officers insurance (Tooma 2012). The 
PCBU is essentially the business or organisation that controls the workplace. Included as 
PCBUs are some individuals (such as sole traders and partners conducting a business in 
partnership), as well as volunteer organisations and legal ‘persons’ (entities) such as 
companies5. A primary duty of each PCBU is to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, the 
health and safety of workers. This includes workers directly engaged by the PCBU and those 
whose activities are influenced or directed by the PCBU (WHS Act 2010, s19).  
The duty of care required of an officer of a PCBU is that the officer “must exercise due diligence 
to ensure the [PCBU] complies with its duties or obligations” (Corporations Act 2001, s27(1), 
emphasis added). The minimum due diligence requirements outlined in section 27(5) of the 
WHS Act provide important guidance about the actions officers need to undertake to ensure 
compliance. These include taking reasonable steps to,  
(a)  acquire and keep up-to-date knowledge of work health and safety matters; and 






(b)  gain an understanding of the nature of the operations of the business or undertaking of the 
person conducting the business or undertaking and generally of the hazards and risks 
associated with those operations; and  
(c)  ensure that the person conducting the business or undertaking has available for use, and 
uses, appropriate resources and processes to eliminate or minimise risks to health and safety 
from work carried out as part of the conduct of the business or undertaking; and 
(d)  ensure that the person conducting the business or undertaking has appropriate processes for 
receiving and considering information regarding incidents, hazards and risks and responding 
in a timely way to that information; and 
(e)  ensure that the person conducting the business or undertaking has, and implements, 
processes for complying6 with any duty or obligation of the person conducting the business or 
undertaking under this Act; and 
(f)  verify the provision and use of the resources and processes referred to in paragraphs (c) to (e). 
(Source: Model Work Health and Safety Act 2010, s27(5)) 
Notably, the relevance of both financial and non-financial accounting practices to WHS is 
demonstrated by inclusion of references to activities such as resourcing, performance reporting 
and analysis, and verification (see above, sections 27(5) c, d and f respectively). This reinforces 
the WHS accountability of those officers with accounting expertise and oversight of accounting 
practices.  
3. Managing WHS performance 
To understand how accounting practices might influence WHS risk management, it is first 
important to appreciate what WHS risk is and how and why work-related injuries and illnesses 
occur. This section therefore draws on WHS literature to outline dominant theories of accident 
causation and injury prevention and contextualise the empirical analysis provided in section 4. 
Early safety theorists adopted a technical approach to WHS research, beginning what is now a 
considerable body of research on workplace hazards and conditions (Borys et al 2009). This 
seeks to identify mechanical, gravitational, chemical, toxic, particulate, viral, temperature-related 
and other hazards; to understand the cause-effect relationships between those hazards and 
work-related injury and illness outcomes; and to identify mechanisms capable of controlling the 
risks posed by these hazards (Chhokar 1987). The “unprecedented volume” of WHS risk 
management knowledge reaffirms the robust inverse relationship between the preventative 




WHS control efforts of employers and the subsequent frequency and severity of work injury and 
illness (Al-Tuwaijri 2008, pvii; Ginter 1979; Chelius 1991). As such, it underscores the 
predictable and fundamentally preventable nature of work-related injury and illness (Reason 
1993) that justifies the onus on managers to ensure WHS, and their subsequent accountability 
for serious WHS failures. 
In the 1930’s, an examination of supervisor incident reports led insurance assessor Heinrich 
(1959) to conclude, however, that workplace accidents were, on average, 88% due to unsafe 
acts on the part of the employee, only 10% due to unsafe working conditions and 2% simply 
unpreventable. Heinrich saw injuries primarily as the result of human errors of commission or 
omission (LaBar 1996). These placed humans ‘at the centre of incident causation” (Byard 2006, 
p25) as a result of errors arising from, for example, inexperience, incompetence, carelessness, 
habit, rushing a task, poor or inadequate communications, reliance on poor memory, poor 
fitness, workload stress, ill health, or discretionary decision-making (Morris 2006). His findings 
generated a new body of research into the role of human factors – i.e. attributes such as 
employee behaviours, attitudes, perceptions, motivations, knowledge, values, trust and 
(organisational) culture - in the causation of work-related injury and illness7 (for an overview, 
see Bluff 2011). Therein lay the foundations for a continuing debate over the relative importance 
of providing a safe place versus managing safe people. 
However, as global WHS research increased in sophistication in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s 
two important findings emerged. First, the safe person versus safe place theories of causation 
were not dichotomies reflected in practice. ‘Unsafe behaviours’ may be contributing factors in an 
injury event, however research revealed that many human errors outlined above were rarely ‘the 
root’ cause of incidents but rather symptoms of various, and often multiple, managerial 
decisions and organisational or structural problems (Hopkins 2008). Evidence points, for 
example, to errors being “shaped and provoked by upstream workplace and organisational 






factors” such as inadequate staffing, poorly defined tasks, poorly designed work processes, 
poorly maintained / unsafe equipment and inadequate resourcing, training and supervision 
(Borys 2000, p163). Environmental constraints and management decisions can therefore 
“create error-enforcing and violation-promoting conditions at the sharp end” (Reason 1995, 
p1714) which “easily overwhelm the employee’s best intentions to work safely” (DeJoy et al. 
2004, p56). Personal variables such as employee knowledge and attitude, while important, are 
seldom sufficient to ensure safe behaviour (DeJoy et al. 2004, Reason 1993). Consequently, 
WHS legislation requires identification and control of both technical and behavioural risks and 
specifies workers be provided: first and foremost, with a safe place of work, safe systems of 
work, proper and adequately maintained plant and equipment; then adequate training, and 
competent staff to manage and supervise (CCH 2003; CCH 2004; AS1470 1986; Else and 
Beaumont 2000). 
The second important finding emerging from a review of the WHS literature is that the body of 
technical and human factors WHS research8 focuses almost entirely at understanding hazards 
and controls at the operational, or ‘factory floor’, level. Studies have examined WHS risk and 
risk management from the perspective of employees, immediate supervisors, safety committees 
and unions, but limited attention to date has been paid to understanding how the technical, 
behavioural and structural factors that contribute to WHS risk may be shaped by more senior 
management. This is important because:  
Safety is primarily a leadership responsibility. It is true that workers have a role in ensuring their 
own safety and the safety of others, but it is leaders who establish the culture of an organisation 
(Schein 1992), allocate resources and establish priorities. These things are crucial to workplace 
safety and they are peculiarly within the control of leaders (Hopkins 2007, p2). 
This suggests there is a case for holding leaders accountable for WHS failures. References 
within the WHS Act to specific accounting practices, such as financial resource allocation, also 
suggests a potential justification for the extension of this accountability to accounting officers 
participating in strategic and financial decision-making at an organisational level.  




4. Accounting as a contributory factor in WHS failure 
This section reflects on prior case studies to consider how strategic and financial decisions are 
implicated in two Australian WHS disasters: the Esso Longford gas explosion (1998) and the 
Glenbrook train crash (1999). Each case was examined in detail by Andrew Hopkins, a 
professor of sociology and leading expert in the fields of WHS, who summarised the contributing 
factors he identified in a causal diagram. His diagrams (presented in Figures 1 and 2) visibly 
illustrate the seemingly random, but often predictable, confluence of contributory factors that 
lead to serious WHS failures (Hopkins 2008).  
Hopkins classifies contributing factors as immediate, organisational and corporate (Hopkins 
2005) and in some cases extends his analyses to also identify governmental / regulatory and 
societal factors (Hopkins 2005; 2000). He argues, however, that most accident investigations 
fail to look beyond the immediate and organisational factors and, as a result, fail to identify 
important relationships between WHS outcomes and organisational decisions and structures far 
removed from the actual site of an incident. These relationships are now explored by reflecting 
on the way routine accounting practices appear to have contributed to the two WHS disasters 
analysed by Hopkins (2000, 2005). 
Case A: The Esso’s gas plant explosion - Longford Victoria, 25th September, 1998.  
Background (extract from Hopkins 2000) 
“Things happened on that day that no one had ever seen at Longford before. A steel cylinder 
sprang a leak that let liquid hydrocarbon spill onto the ground. A dribble at first, but then, over 
the course of the morning it developed into a cascade… Ice formed on pipework that was 
normally too hot to touch. Pumps that never stopped, ceased flowing and refused to start. 
Storage tank liquid levels that were normally stable plummeted… I was in Control Room One 
when the first explosion ripped apart a 14-tonne steel vessel, 25 meters from where I was 
standing. It sent shards of steel, dust, debris and liquid hydrocarbon into the atmosphere” (The 
Age 30/9/99). 
These are the words of the operator whom Esso blamed for the accident at its gas plant at 
Longford, Victoria on 25 September 1998, an accident which killed two men, injured eight others 
and cut Melbourne’s gas supply for two weeks.  
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The Royal Commission took the view that neither this man nor any of the others present on the day 
was at fault, for none of them understood the significance of the mysterious events they were 
witnessing. The fault was Esso’s. The company had “failed to take measures which were plainly 
practicable”, measures which it “could and should” have taken.                         (Hopkins 2000, p1) 
The company’s analysis of the cause of the incident is purported to have concluded that the on-
duty control room operators and supervisors made a number of crucial and inexcusable errors. 
However, operator error was the beginning, rather than the end, of the analysis undertaken by 
Hopkins who suggests, 
Asking why errors were made is far more useful than asking who is to blame. Asking why leads 
invariably to more fundamental cultural and organisational causes. Inquiries must get to this level if 
they are to be of any value in preventing recurrences. Moreover, once it is understood that there are 
reasons why people behave as they do, blame becomes far less appropriate (Hopkins 2005, p27).  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Hopkins’ (2000) analysis, reproduced in Figure 1, identified numerous internal and external 
contributory factors. Importantly, resource allocation decisions at the corporate level were 
identified as an important driver of numerous organisational-level contributing factors. For 
example, cost reductions reportedly led to a maintenance backlog and to understaffing; the 
latter implicated in poor engineering design, poor operational supervision and the indefinite 
postponement of the gas plant’s crucial hazard identification and operability audit (HAZOP). 
Furthermore, Hopkins observes that the concern about cost control “had been effectively 
communicated to the workforce” to such an extent that the operator reported to the inquiry, 
I would go so far as to say I faced a dilemma on the day, standing 20 metres from the explosion and 
the fire, as to whether or not I should activate the ESD 1 (Emergency Shutdown 1), because I was, 
for some strange reason, worried about the possible impact on production (Hopkins 2000, p146). 
Cost-control was not the only way in which accounting practices are reported to have 
contributed to the gas plant disaster. Hopkins’ (2000) suggests the firm’s incident reporting, 
performance auditing and performance management systems had “systematically ignored 
previous upsets which might have provided warnings of disaster” (p79) and instead focused 
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(almost entirely) around one inappropriate KPI (lost time injuries9) that “distracted attention from 
the risk of a major incident” (p76). The distraction results from the failure of lost time injury data 
to reliably capture injury outcomes or latent WHS risk. Hopkins’ (2000) noted, 
Safety was measured in terms of lost time injuries and Esso’s safety efforts were therefore 
focused on minimising the number of minor injuries… Such a strategy ignored completely the 
special role of management in controlling major hazards… [also] the focus on lost time injuries 
impeded the recognition of hazards implicit in unrepaired equipment, thereby distorting Esso’s 
maintenance program (Hopkins 2000, p79).  
Dekker (2011) suggests that within a complex system, reliance on a single performance 
measure can limit or amplify the local knowledge available for others to see and thus “direct and 
constrain what other people in the complex system will see as sensible, rational or even 
possible” (p14). For Esso, it appears that over time the absence of injury came to be interpreted 
within the organisation as ‘safety’ even though latent hazards and their warning signs had 
routinely been present. The result illustrates what Dekker (2011) calls a ‘drift to failure’; the 
gradual, incremental decline into disaster driven by factors that serve to ‘normalise deviations’ 
(Turner 1978) and by doing so obscure ever increasing levels of risk. 
In summarising his conclusions, Hopkins (2000) observes that companies should actively seek 
out and apply the valuable lessons to be learned from the mistakes of others. Among the 
‘lessons from Longford’ are cautionary tales for those with responsibility for the control and 
oversight of budgeting and financial resource allocation (particularly with regard to capital 
expenditure, equipment maintenance, training and human resourcing). Critically, the findings 
also present lessons for those charged with the design and implementation of performance 
management systems by demonstrating the importance of understanding what key performance 
measures actually capture. Without this knowledge, valid interpretation of performance 
information may be compromised and the ability to pre-empt and assess any potentially 
significant dysfunctional consequences may be hampered. 






Case B: The Glenbrook Train Crash - Glenbrook, New South Wales, 2nd December, 1999. 
Background (extract from Hopkins 2005) 
In December 1999, a busy commuter train bringing people from the Blue Mountains to work in 
Sydney arrived at a red light at Glenbrook Station, and stopped. The driver had already been 
told that the light was probably defective and that it had gone to red as a failsafe mechanism, so 
he radioed the signaller and asked: “I’m right to past it, am I, mate?” 
Minutes earlier, the Indian Pacific, on the last leg of its journey from Perth to Sydney, had 
[stopped, sought permission and] been authorised to pass the same signal. However, it had 
stopped [again] just over a kilometre ahead at a second red light. The signaller did not know that 
the Indian Pacific had stopped [for a second time because the driver had been unable to make 
contact due to difficulties with the trackside phone (p42)], and [so the signaller] replied to the 
driver of the commuter train: “yeah, mate, you certainly are.” 
The commuter train accelerated away, but upon rounding a bend the driver was aghast to see 
the interstate train in his way. He applied the emergency brakes and ran back through the 
carriage warning people of the impending crash. He survived, but seven of his passengers did 
not (Hopkins 2005, p25). 
In his analysis of this case, Hopkins (2005) recites how the rail track owner “argued that the 
driver of the commuter train was solely to blame, because he was driving too fast”, while 
conversely, counsel acting for the lives lost in the accident “argued the signaller and a train 
controller had shown ‘reckless indifference’ to their jobs” (p27). By again asking why errors were 
made, rather than focusing on issues of blame, Hopkins identified a multitude of factors as 
contributing to the incident and developed a model of accident causation (see Figure 2). 
Adopting an overtly cultural perspective in his analysis of this case, Hopkins’ causal model 
illustrates that “the question of why the driver did not proceed with ‘extreme caution’ is no more 
important that the question of why the Indian Pacific was delayed” (p78). Instead, the analysis 
again reveals multiple causes (or drivers) of each of these two critical factors. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Hopkins’ (2005) concluded that four cultural drivers contributed to the disaster. First, a culture of 
rules, depicted in the creation of seemingly endless volumes of detailed rules and amendments 
that workers failed to fully understand or comply with. Second, a culture of silos, where 
individuals for various reasons possessed limited awareness of how their tasks, responsibilities 
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and problems connected with and contributed to broader organisational processes and risks. 
Third, a culture of on-time-running in which ‘production’ goals were perceived not only as 
paramount, but non-negotiable. Finally, a subsequent culture of risk-blindness, as inadequate 
training, bureaucratic rule-reliance and inadequate support for individuals seeking to report and 
act on safety issues left many workers increasingly disempowered and ever less risk aware10.  
Two types of accounting practices appear to have been implicated in these cultural contexts, 
and ultimately in the WHS risk that led to the disaster. First is the performance management 
system reported to have incentivised the institutionalised pursuit of on-time-running (OTR). The 
Commissioner conducting the Inquiry concluded, in part, that the emphasis on OTR 
performance targets had compromised safety. OTR “had become so entrenched in the attitudes 
of railway operational personnel that they could no longer objectively assess anomalous 
situations” and consequently, the indoctrination of OTR performance goals had led to “an 
attitude that could not be varied under any circumstances – trains had to run on time despite the 
circumstances” (p51). Numerous other instances in which safety had been “sacrificed to 
punctuality” also came to light in the inquiry’s proceedings (p57). These included instances in 
which speed triggers on safety mechanisms had been increased so trains could move more 
quickly through intermediate stops, and reports of pressure on drivers to operate trains that 
were known to be defective.  
The latter alludes to the second way in which financial decision-making appeared to be 
implicated in safety failure; inadequate investment in infrastructure and routine maintenance. 
The lack of capital expenditure on communications technology was a particular case in point. 
First, the signal box which covered the Glenbrook area did not have the generally available 
electronic ‘train indicator board’ to indicate the exact position of trains in the area. Second, no 
fewer than five different communication devices were used for communications between drivers, 
controllers and signallers. As summarised by Hopkins (2005), 
                                                 
10 Hopkins (2005) devotes a separate chapter to the in depth analysis of each of these four cultural causes. 
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The commuter train was equipped with a Sydney-area two way radio which enabled it to 
communicate with the signaller and the controller, but not the driver of any other train. The Indian 
Pacific was equipped with a second two way radio system which enabled it to communicate with 
drivers of other long-distance trains, as well as signallers. A third radio system was also available 
to the drivers of the Indian Pacific, the signaller and the guard on the commuter train, but not the 
commuter train driver or the train controller. Mobile phones were available to some railway staff. 
Finally there were phones at the base of each signal which enabled drivers to communicate with 
signallers. The latter system was antiquated technology which required the driver to get down 
from the train, walk to the phone box, open it with a key (if it was locked) and crank a handle 
fifteen times in order to get the attention of the signaller at the other end. [Note, drivers of 
commuter trains seeking permission to pass signals at stop could use the local Sydney–area 
radio but drivers of interstate trains were required to alight and use the phone located on the 
signal box – even in peak hour when the commuter train system was under stress]. The 
Commissioner was incredulous at the antiquated nature of this system, “Perhaps he could send 
up a smoke signal. Really, in the 21st century, a technology that was early 20th century is still 
being used to communicate. I find that very difficult to understand” (p64). 
The combination of “archaic phone technology” (p77) and “non-functioning radios” with evidence 
of “defective brakes” (p35) and “defective signals” (p58) alluded to a cost-culture of systemic 
under-investment in the purchase and routine maintenance of critical infrastructure. This 
appeared to undermine other WHS risk management efforts. In summing up his analysis of the 
Glenbrook crash, Hopkins (2005) offers the following lesson,  
This analysis of the New South Wales railways has revealed a complex and multifaceted 
relationship between organisational culture and safety. …improving safety is not simply a matter 
of grafting a culture of safety onto an existing organisational culture. The point is that the existing 
organisational culture, whatever it is, has implications for safety, and these need to be 
understood. Some aspects of an existing culture may need to be modified before significant 
safety improvements are possible (p78). 
5. Discussion: Accounting for WHS Governance 
This review has shown how financial resource allocation and performance management 
decisions appear to have inadvertently contributed to the latent hazards that precipitated WHS 
failure and loss of life. The potential for inadequate or misdirected financial resources to 
undermine an organisation’s capacity to operate safely suggests traditional (operational level) 
technical and cultural WHS controls are unlikely to be sufficient to ensure WHS. Effective WHS 
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governance is therefore required to supplement technical and cultural controls as a necessary 
component of WHS risk management (see Figure 3). 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Importantly, the recent Australian WHS legislation’s articulation of both a definition of officers 
and their WHS due diligence requirements plays an important role in clarifying and 
communicating concepts of WHS governance. The due diligence requirements seek to help 
stem the fundamentally preventable WHS failures that are repeated time and again amid claims 
of a “depressing sameness” in their causes11 (Hopkins 2008, p4). Be they explosions in high-
hazard facilities, collapses in underground mines, road crashes and roll-overs in heavy vehicle 
transport, falls from height on construction projects, psycho-social disorders among office 
workers, or violently amputated or crushed limbs in machines and conveyor belts; the 
contributing factors to WHS failure habitually point to issues of inadequate investment (in risk-
awareness and risk-control training, staffing, plant and equipment maintenance and capital 
expenditure12), goal conflict and inappropriate choices in performance measures and systems 
(see for example Berger 2007; 2009; Hopkins 2008, p4; Reason 2008).  
It is a tragic irony that the failure costs associated with poor WHS tend to far outweigh cost 
savings realised through inadequate risk identification and elimination/control processes. So 
what is it that prevents organisations, and their accounting officers, from learning the important 
lessons embedded in the tragedies of others? This review suggests that perhaps the most 
important lessons for accounting officers relate less to recognising the need to engage in WHS 
risk management and more to understanding how to effectively engage in WHS risk 
management processes.  For example, both firms examined above had WHS risk management 
programs in place and Esso had even won an industry award for its safety performance the year 






12  For example inadequate investment in fitting protective guards and other safety features. 
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prior to the disaster at Longford. However, as Hopkins (2005) noted, efforts to ‘graft’ safety 
objectives on to existing financial performance objectives were prone to creating serious goal 
conflict and undermining the success of WHS investment. Officers must therefore appreciate 
and address the interconnectedness of financial and WHS goals. For many, this will require a 
fundamental change in thinking from ‘resourcing work health and safety’ to ‘resourcing safe and 
healthy work’.  
Resourcing safe and healthy work 
The notion of resourcing safe and healthy work presents a threshold concept of WHS. It forms a 
conceptual bridge between accounting practice and WHS risk. Threshold concepts are vital but 
challenging concepts that, once grasped, radically transform the way something is understood 
or interpreted - unlocking a portal to new and previously inaccessible ways of thinking (Davies 
2006; Meyer and Land 2006). Threshold concepts are difficult because the knowledge they 
create requires the integration of information from multiple, often unfamiliar, disciplines (Cousins 
2006; Davies 2006; Lucas and Mladenovic 2007; Meyer and Land 2006). Resourcing safe and 
healthy work draws on “disconcerting new territory” (Meyer and Land 2006, pxv) and therefore 
may initially appear counterintuitive from the primarily financial, relevant cost perspective of 
traditional accounting education which has largely ignored externalities, those costs incapable of 
reliable measurement and the practical implications of accounting decisions on WHS.  
At a practical level, strategies and process for resourcing safe and healthy work contrast starkly 
with those for allocating resources to separate activities of 1) work (production) and 2) WHS risk 
management. The latter is often enacted by ‘grafting on’ WHS-related line items in budgets and 
management reports and designing WHS to essentially function as an organisational ‘silo’. In 
contrast the former requires a deliberately considered integration of production and safety goals 
and relies on holistic assessments of work for performance appraisal and financial (including 
human resource) allocation decisions (Tooma 2012). This may require changes in accounting 
practices to ensure accounting officers engage in the essential change management WHS risk 
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assessment processes so often demanded of employees at lower levels in an organisation’s 
structure (Hopkins 2008). Recommendations for accounting practice include:  
 Organisational change: Assessments need to consider safe and healthy staffing levels13 for both 
operational and supervisory positions, for all decisions relating to restructure, downsizing, 
redundancy and organisational change (This not only includes adequate staff to ensure safe work 
during periods of shutdown maintenance, installation of new systems or machines, and takeovers 
and mergers, but also considers mental health risks associated with increasing workloads and 
the resulting impact on workpace and work stress14);  
 Capital expenditure appraisals: Assessments explicitly consider issues such as safe design, safe 
layout and / or safety modifications (eg ‘buy quiet’ to reduce the risk of hearing loss among 
operators or building in funds for upgrades such as safety guards on purchase);  
 Budget allocations: Budgets must provide adequate funding for those activities which foster safe 
work – e.g. routine maintenance to ensure vehicles and equipment are in good order, and 
adequate and effective training that heightens risk awareness (including awareness of how an 
individual’s tasks connect with other roles and risks – see Case B) and engages workers in the 
overall pursuit of safe work.  
By explicitly considering the WHS implications of strategic and financial change within routine 
decision-making processes, safety no longer stands as an organisational goal in competition for 
resources with other goals such as production. Instead it becomes an essential component of 
the production goal itself. Furthermore, this holistic approach better positions WHS risk within 
the organisational risk management framework. 
5. Conclusion 
The practice of accounting is not generally perceived as a physically hazardous occupation and 
accounting for WHS is not typically addressed in undergraduate, postgraduate or professional 
accounting education. Despite this, the legally enforceable duty of care and WHS due diligence 
obligations imposed by recent Australian WHS legislation on all officers of an organisation 
renders many senior accounting officers individually responsible, and accountable, for work 
health and safety governance. This review demonstrates how the officers’ WHS due diligence 
requirements acknowledge the significant, albeit indirect, influence of accountants on the day-
to-day reality of workplace health and safety and, more importantly, target specific accounting 






practices that have repeatedly been shown to obstruct WHS risk management efforts and 
contributed to the occurrence and reoccurrence of work-related fatality, injury and illness. The 
imposition of a legal duty of care on those accounting officers charged with oversight of 
resource allocation and performance management functions therefore appears justified.  
Importantly, this paper illustrates the potentially tangible and significant implications that the 
routine decisions of accountants, financial controllers, chief financial officers, chief executive 
officers and directors have for the level of WHS risk facing others within an organisation.  These 
actors are prominent in organisational responses to contemporary pressures of globalisation, 
advances in technology, management techniques and work processes. However, many of the 
strategies they promote to make workplaces more competitive and productive, changes such as 
downsizing, increasing hours of work, increasing work intensification (workload) and work pace, 
have simultaneously been associated with significant adverse impact on WHS risk15 and 
increasing WHS failure cost. Consequently, a need for explicit consideration of the WHS risk 
implications of strategic and financial decisions cannot be overstated and WHS governance 
practices guided by an appreciation of the threshold concept of ensuring safe and healthy work 
has never been more important.  
Further research currently underway at Macquarie University’s IGAP Research Centre seeks to 
understand how this new WHS duty of care is interpreted by accounting officers and the 
processes through which WHS governance processes are operationalized. Additional research 
is also required to understand the extent to which contemporary accounting courses; 
undergraduate, postgraduate, and business education more generally, are seeking to educate 
accounting professionals about the health and safety implications of material financial decisions 
and accounting change processes. Overall, however, it would appear that a more holistic 
approach to the socially responsible practice of accounting may indeed actually save lives. 







Figure 1: Causal diagram of the Esso Gas Plant Explosion 





Figure 2: Causal Diagram of the Glenbrook Train Crash 





Figure 3: WHS governance framework 
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 Appendix 1 
 
Corporations Act 2001 (Extract) 
Part 1.2, Division 1  
Section 7… 
[An] officer of a corporation means: 
(a) a director or secretary of the corporation; or 
(b) a person: 
(i) who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part, of the 
business of the corporation; or 
(ii) who has the capacity to affect significantly the corporation’s financial standing; or 
(iii) in accordance with whose instructions or wishes the directors of the corporation are accustomed 
to act (excluding advice given by the person in the proper performance of functions attaching to 
the person’s professional capacity or their business relationship with the directors or the 
corporation); or 
(c) a receiver, or receiver and manager, of the property of the corporation; or 
(d) an administrator of the corporation; or 
(e) an administrator of a deed of company arrangement executed by the corporation; or 
(f) a liquidator of the corporation; or 
(g) a trustee or other person administering a compromise or arrangement made between the 
corporation and someone else. 
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